In January 2022, we closed our Series B investment in Flowlink — $22M at a $110M post-money valuation. At the time, the company had $8M ARR, 140 customers, and an NRR of 138%. The product was excellent. The GTM was a mess.
The Problem We Saw
Flowlink had found product-market fit through founder-led sales and an extraordinarily effective product-led growth motion — users were signing up, activating, and expanding with almost no human intervention. But the company had no repeatable enterprise motion. Every deal above $50K ACV required the CEO or CTO to close it personally.
This is a common pattern at Series B: the PLG flywheel is spinning, NRR is strong, and the founding team has proven the product works. But scaling beyond $20–30M ARR requires a different muscle.
What We Did Together
In the six months after closing, our value creation team worked with Flowlink on three things:
1. Sales motion redesign. We brought in a Head of Enterprise Sales from a portfolio alumni — someone who had built the commercial motion at a comparable PLG company. Within 90 days they had a defined ICP, a repeatable discovery process, and a pilot program that converted at 68%.
2. Pricing architecture. Flowlink was leaving significant revenue on the table with a per-seat model that capped expansion from power users. We modeled five alternative pricing structures and landed on a usage-plus-seat hybrid that immediately improved net new ARR per customer by 34%.
3. Partnerships. Flowlink's 200+ native integrations were an asset they were not monetizing as a distribution channel. We made three introductions to platform partners — two of which became active reseller relationships generating $4M ARR in year two.
The Result
Twenty-four months after our investment, Flowlink crossed $52M ARR. NRR held at 134%. They closed a $65M Series C in Q4 2025 at a $420M valuation — a 3.8x markup on our Series B entry.
We are still on the board and still long.
